Motivated by Internet targeted advertising, we address several ad allocation problems. Prior work has established that these problems admit no randomized online algorithm better than (1 − 1 e )-competitive (see Karp et al. (1990) and Mehta et al. (2007) ), yet simple heuristics have been observed to perform much better in practice. We explain this phenomenon by studying a generalization of the bounded-degree inputs considered by Buchbinder et al. (2007) , graphs which we call (k, d )-bounded. In such graphs the maximal degree on the online side is at most d and the minimal degree on the offline side is at least k. We prove that, for such graphs, these problems' natural greedy algorithms attain a competitive ratio of 1 − d −1 k+d −1 , tending to 1 as d/k tends to zero. We prove this bound is tight for these algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Internet advertising is ubiquitous. With nearly $ 90 billion spent on Internet advertising in 2015 in the United States alone (see PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2018) ), it has become, to a large extent, the driving economic force behind much of the content of the World Wide Web. How is this advertising space bought and sold? Most ads fall either under sponsored search or targeted advertising, both of which are sold in what constitute instances of the online ad allocation problem.
In online ad allocation, we are faced with the following problem: Advertisers announce to an advertising platform (e.g., Yahoo, Google, Microsoft) what their advertising budgets are and their bids for an ad to be displayed to every kind of user. The user "type" is determined, for example, by search terms searched, in the case of sponsored search, or user demographics, in the case of targeted advertising. When a user visits a web page with an ad slot managed by the ad platform, the latter needs to decide immediately and irrevocably which (if any) of the advertiser's ads to display to the user. The advertising platform's goal is to maximize its revenues, despite uncertainty concerning future page views. This problem can be formulated as a generalization of online bipartite matching, with advertisers as the offline vertices and ad slots as online vertices. 1 See Section 2 for a formal definition of this and other problems we consider.
The theoretical interest in online allocations can be traced back to 1990, when Karp et al. (1990) considered the fundamental problem of bipartite maximum matching in an online setting. In their seminal paper, Karp et al. proved that randomized online algorithms cannot in general achieve a competitive ratio above 1 − 1 e ≈ 0.632 and presented the ranking algorithm, which matches this upper bound and is thus optimal. 2 The online maximum matching problem was generalized first by Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs (2000) and later by Aggarwal et al. (2011) , who presented algorithms achieving an optimal 1 − 1 e competitive ratio for the b-matching and vertex-weighted matching problems, respectively. The AdWords problem, first proposed by Mehta et al. (2007) , is the more general ad allocation problem, subject to the realistic small bid assumption (i.e., assuming every advertiser i has budget B i much larger than its bids b i j ). (This assumption is necessary to achieve nontrivial results. See Section 6.4.) For this problem, too, the natural greedy algorithm has a competitive ratio of 1 2 . Mehta et al. gave an algorithm for this problem with a competitive ratio of 1 − 1 e . Buchbinder et al. (2007) achieved the same results using an online primal-dual approach. (See Mehta (2012) for an in-depth survey of prior art and techniques used to tackle these problems.)
We will address the problems just discussed, but first we start with motivation.
Motivation
As is to be expected of a problem for which a loss of 1/e ≈ 36.7% translates to billions of dollars in potential revenue lost yearly, researchers have studied weaker models than the adversarial model for the ad allocation problem in the hope that these may permit better guarantees, help model realworld data, and derive better algorithms for these data. (See Section 1.5.) In this article, we revisit the stronger adversarial model for graphs with structural characteristics met by many ad allocation instances arising from targeted advertising. Specifically, we assume advertisers are interested in a large number of ad slots (at least k), and that every ad slot is of interest to a relatively small number of advertisers (at most d). As with the small bid assumption B i b i j for the AdWords problem, assumption of the preceding structure is not only useful in order to obtain better bounds 1 In this article, without loss of generality, we assume advertisers only pay for impressions and not, e.g., clicks. 2 The original proof of ranking's competitive ratio was found to contain a mistake nearly 20 years later by Krohn and Varadarajan, but the algorithm's performance has since been re-proven by Birnbaum and Mathieu (2008) , Goel and Mehta (2008) , and, recently, by Devanur et al. (2013) .
(as we will show), but it also constitutes a reasonable assumption for targeted advertising for the following twin reasons: Online side: Advertisers typically target their advertising campaigns at specific segments of the population (e.g., young Californians who ski often); while these segments may be large in absolute terms, they are mostly small in relative terms (e.g., less than 4% of Californians ski often). Consequently, users tend to belong to relatively few segments. Coupled with the fact that the number of active campaigns at any given time is limited, this implies a restricted pool of ads that might be displayed to any particular user, thus justifying the small degree assumption for ad slots. Offline side: Advertisers typically target large segments of the population (as in the preceding example) while not allocating a budget high enough to display ads to all users in a segment. Coupled with the fact that every page-view of a particular targeted user corresponds to a vertex in the graph, this implies the high-degree assumption on the offline side, and, more generally for the ad allocation problem, the assumption that i, j b i j ≥ k · B i for some large k.
We call the graphs displaying these characteristics (k, d )-bounded graphs.
We concern ourselves with such graphs with k large and d small. For brevity's sake, as all graphs in this article will be bipartite, we refrain from stating the fact explicitly; likewise, we refer to (k, d )-bounded graphs as (k, d )-graphs henceforth. As the problems studied in this article are all maximization problems, we adopt the convention that a lower bound indicates a positive result and an upper bound indicates a negative result.
Our Results
By focusing on (k, d )-graphs, we justify the observed success of greedy algorithms "in the wild" beyond their theoretical guarantees (see Section 8 for a discussion of said success), and we propose algorithms that are exponentially better and provably optimal under these structural assumptions. Finally, we leverage our deterministic algorithms to prove that simple randomized algorithms achieve the same bounds in expectation. Our results hold for the maximum matching, vertexweighted matching, and AdWords problems (with the exception of the matching upper bound for the latter). Table 1 delineates our results for these problems on (k, d )-graphs. We obtain similar results for the general ad allocation problem, even with rather large bids (see Section 1.5.)
We begin by explaining the empirical success of greedy algorithms for the preceding problems (i.e., algorithms matching an arriving ad slot to the most lucrative feasible neighbor), proving these algorithms' loss is proportional to the ratio of the maximal degree in the online side to the minimal degree in the offline side; that is, their competitive ratio tends to 1 as this ratio tends to zero. We complement this lower bound with a family of examples for which these algorithms do no better. Theorem 1.2. Greedy algorithms achieve a competitive ratio of
We improve on the preceding, designing deterministic algorithms with exponentially smaller loss. We prove this is optimal for deterministic algorithms. Theorem 1.3. There exist (new) deterministic online algorithms for the unweighted and vertexweighted matching problems with competitive a ratio of 1 
Algorithms
General Graphs
This work
This work can be achieved deterministically for AdWords. In stating our bounds for general ad allocation, we follow the notation of Buchbinder et al. (2007) and denote the maximum bid-to-budget ratio by
. Theorem 1.5. There exists a (new) deterministic algorithm which gains at least
To contrast our results with the state of the art, we note that the algorithms of Mehta et al. (2007) , Buchbinder et al. (2007) , and Devanur et al. (2013) achieve a competitive ratio of (1 − R max ) · (1 − 1/(1 + R max ) 1/R max ). This bound tends to 1 − 1 e from below as R max tends to zero but is far from this value for larger R max . Our algorithms fare better whenever k ≥ d even for rather large R max . As stated in Section 1.1, we expect k to be significantly larger than d, but, in order to emphasize the strength of our bound, let us consider only the case d/k = R max . Table 2 displays the resulting competitive ratios. Note that, in this regime, our algorithm is already better at R max = 1 3 than prior algorithms are at the limit (i.e., when R max → 0).
Better still, our algorithms are robust to a few outlying advertisers increasing R max , as the
. This is the first such result in the adversarial setting. To the best of our knowledge, only the algorithm of Devanur et al. (2012) for the independent and identically distributed model holds this desired property. Likewise, our algorithms are robust to few outlying advertisers making the input not (k, d )-bounded (alternatively, decreasing k), as the following theorem asserts. 
Finally, we prove that the naïve randomized algorithm, random, which matches every arriving ad slot to a feasible neighbor chosen uniformly at random, and in general has competitive a ratio tending to 1/2, attains the same bounds as our optimal deterministic algorithms in expectation despite making no use of the input's structure. Theorem 1.7. Algorithm random matches the bounds of Theorems 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6 in expectation.
Techniques
As with many previous ad allocation algorithms, our algorithms can be seen as bid-scaling algorithms. That is, matches are chosen greedily based on the bids b i j of each advertiser i, times a scaling factor. However, contrary to previous algorithms (Mehta et al. 2007; Buchbinder et al. 2007; Devanur et al. 2013 ) that scale bids according to 1 − e f (i )−1 , where f (i) is the fraction of i's budget spent so far, our algorithms essentially scale bids according to an exponential in u, the number of unused opportunities to spend as much as the current bid value b i j ; specifically, we scale by
Other differences can be seen in our algorithms' primal-dual interpretation: We make no use of the ad slots' dual variables, leaving them at zero throughout (prior work increases these variables in order to guarantee dual feasibility); instead, our algorithms only update the dual variables of each arriving ad slot's neighbors. Interestingly, our online primal-dual algorithms do not guarantee dual feasibility throughout their execution, but only upon termination. To the best of our knowledge, ours are the first online primal-dual algorithms with this behavior.
The preceding approach works directly for vertex-weighted matching. To generalize our approach to ad allocations, we first consider an intermediary problem-equal-bids ad allocationwhere every advertiser i bids the same bid b i for all neighbors j ∈ N (i). We reduce this problem in (k, d )-graphs to the vertex-weighted problem in (k, d )-graphs in an online manner. We then rewrite this reduction along with our vertex-weighted online algorithm as a single online primaldual algorithm for the equal-bids problem. Guided by this algorithm, we devise a primal-dual algorithm for general-bids ad allocation on (k, d )-graphs using a bounded fraction of the advertisers' dual variables to guide our choice of matches and dual updates. This allows us to simulate the bid-scaling described earlier even when advertisers make different bids per ad slot.
Finally, our randomized results stem from our deterministic primal-dual algorithms, whose dual updates we use in our dual-fitting analysis of the randomized algorithms. Dual feasibility follows as it does for our algorithms. The dual costs are bounded in expectation by the primal cost times the required constant, conditioned over the random algorithm's previous choices. Taking total expectation over the possible previous choices yields the expected competitive ratio.
Intuition
Here, we give a high-level outline of why one should expect to obtain better competitive guarantees on (k, d )-graphs than on more general graphs and to motivate our algorithms. Having k large implies that each advertiser has many opportunities to exhaust her budget. On the other hand, having d (and R max ) small implies that each arriving ad slot "uses up" few of the opportunities of its neighboring advertisers. As a result, one would expect to have enough chances to spend much of each advertiser's budget. Our algorithms take this intuition one step further: Guided by the observation that advertisers with many "missed" opportunities may have fewer remaining chances to spend their budget than other advertisers, we scale bids by a function of the number of missed opportunities. While the choice of this particular function may seem a little mysterious at first, it becomes clear once analyzed using the online primal-dual framework of Buchbinder and Naor (2009) .
Related Work
Several stochastic models have been studied for the problems we address. Most prominent among these are the random arrival order and independent and identically distributed model with known/unknown distribution. Our algorithms beat all of these bounds in the worst case for sufficiently small d/k and R max , replacing stochastic assumptions by structural ones.
For the random order model, a line of work beginning with Goel and Mehta (2008) has shown the optimal competitive ratio for maximum matching lies in the range (0.696, 0.823) (Feldman et al. 2009; Mahdian and Yan 2011; Manshadi et al. 2012) . For the known distribution model Feldman et al. (2009) were the first to show that the optimal competitive ratio is strictly greater than 1 − 1 e and bounded away from 1. Subsequent work (Bahmani and Kapralov 2010; Haeupler et al. 2011; Jaillet and Lu 2013) showed the optimal competitive ratio for bipartite matching in this setting lies in the range (0.706, 0.823), and (0.729, 0.823) if the expected number of arrivals of each ad slot type is integral. For the vertex-weighted problem under the previously mentioned integrality assumptions Haeupler et al. (2011) and Jaillet and Lu (2013) showed a lower bound of 0.667 and 0.725, respectively. For the AdWords problem under the random order model, Devanur and Hayes (2009) give a (1 − ϵ )-competitive algorithm, assuming the online side's size is known in advance and no bid is higher than roughly ϵ 3 /|L| 2 times the optimum value. Devanur et al. (2012) gave an algorithm in the unknown distribution model achieving an asymptotically optimal competitive ratio of 1 − O ( √ R max ). In a different vein, Mahdian et al. (2007) considered the AdWords problem given black-box estimates of the input. They show how to obtain performance by trading off between the worst-case optimal and the black box's performance on the given input. We require no such algorithm to be available, but instead rely on domain-specific structure.
Closer to our work, Buchbinder et al. (2007) considered (1, d )-graphs for equal-bids ad allocation. We obtain more general results and strictly better bounds for all k > d.
Outline of the Article
In Section 2, we formally define the problems considered throughout this article. In Section 3, we give a tight analysis of algorithm greedy in (k, d )-graphs. In Section 4, we build on the bad examples of Section 3 and present optimal algorithms for the online maximum matching and vertexweighted matching problems in (k, d )-graphs. In Section 5, we extend these results to the general ad allocation problem. In Section 6, we present hardness results for the problems considered. In Section 7, we extend our analysis to prove competitiveness of the natural randomized algorithm. We conclude with a discussion of future work and open questions in Section 8.
PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
An instance of the ad allocation problem consists of a bipartite graph G = (L, R, E). The left-hand side L corresponds to advertisers and the right-hand side R to ad slots. Each advertiser i ∈ L has some budget B i and is willing to bid some value b i j ≤ B i for every neighboring ad slot j ∈ N (i) (the bids of advertiser i need not be equal for all j ∈ N (i)). Each ad slot j ∈ R can be allocated to (up to) one advertiser i, yielding a profit of b i j . The bids for ad slots allocated to an advertiser i may not exceed i's budget, B i . Figure 1 presents the ad allocation problem's LP relaxation and its dual.
An instance of the online ad allocation problem consists of an ad allocation instance; the advertisers given up front, along with their budgets; and the ad slots arriving one by one, together with their edges and bids. An online ad allocation algorithm must, upon arrival of an ad slot j, determine to which advertiser (if any) to allocate the ad slot. Allocations are irrevocable and so must be made to feasible advertisers whose residual budget is sufficient to pay their actual bid. We will consider several interesting special cases of this problem throughout this article. These problems are both interesting in their own right (theoretically as well as practically), in addition to providing some insight toward achieving a solution to the general problem.
The equal-bids online ad allocation problem is the preceding problem, but with each advertiser i bidding the same value for all neighboring ad slots (i.e., b i j = b i for all j ∈ N (i)).
The online vertex-weighted matching problem is the preceding problem, but with every advertiser i bidding all its budget for every neighboring ad slot (i.e., b i j = B i for all j ∈ N (i)).
The online maximum matching problem is the preceding problem, but with all budgets and bids equal to 1 (i.e., b i j = B i = 1 for all j ∈ N (i)).
WARM-UP: GREEDINESS IN (K, D)-GRAPHS
In this section we show that the natural greedy algorithms for the problems considered, which in general graphs are only 1/2-competitive, achieve on (k, d )-graphs a competitive ratio tending to 1 as d/k tends to zero. We prove this result by applying dual-fitting, and prove our analysis is tight.
Algorithm greedy for the online ad allocation problem matches an ad slot j ∈ R to a feasible neighbor i with highest bid b i j . Our analysis relies on the dual-fitting formulation given in Algorithm 1. 
Proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. To prove these theorems, we prove the following claims: Before proving these claims, we show how they imply the above two theorems. As x forms an integral feasible primal solution, claims (a,b,c) combined entail Theorem 3.1. Similarly, claims (a,b,d ) entail Theorem 3.2, as claims (b) and (d) imply the ratio of the solutions' overall values is at least
.
Claim (a):
For every advertiser i ∈ L, if more than a (1 − R max )-fraction of i's budget is spent, then z i is set to 1 in Line 10. Otherwise, i is a feasible match of all of its neighbors j, each such j causing z i to increase by at least 
Claim (c):
For an advertiser i ∈ L to have spent more than (1 − R max )B i for all but the general problem, it must and have z i set to 1. Thus, Lines 8-10 incur no dual cost.
Claim (d):
For an advertiser i ∈ L to be affected by Lines 8-10, it must spend up to a (1 − R max )-fraction of its budget. However, whenever i spends an f -fraction of its budget, the dual variable z i increases by f in Line 6, and so the cost of increasing z i in Line 10 is at most R max · B i , while i garnered a primal profit of at least (1 − R max ) · B i . The total dual cost of Lines 8-10 is thus at most R max 1−R max · P, for P the primal profit.
Tight Examples for Algorithm greedy
We show that our analysis of algorithm greedy for the unweighted and vertex-weighted matching is tight whenever
graphs G with maximal matchings that achieve a competitive ratio no better than
Proof. The tight example, along with a poor choice of matching, consists of k + d − 1 advertisers and k 2 + k ad slots. We denote by M L = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } and U L = {i k+1 , i k+2 , . . . , i k+d −1 } the advertisers that will be matched and not matched, respectively. The first k ad slots by order of arrival, j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k , each have degree exactly d, with the t-th ad slot j t neighboring the t-th advertiser i t to which it is matched, as well as For any R max, a unit fraction (i.e., the reciprocal of an integer), gluing 1/R max copies of the above tight example at the advertisers, with each advertiser having a budget of 1/R max , yields an equalbid ad allocation instance and greedy allocation for which the same k k+d −1 performance holds, proving tightness of our analysis for equal-bid allocations. We now state a theorem implying our analysis' tightness for greedy in general ad allocations. 
Each advertiser has budget exactly 1. We designate k · b advertisers to be the "lucky" advertisers from which we will achieve revenue of (1 − R max ), and the remaining (d − 1) · a "unlucky" advertisers will garner no profit. The theorem will follow by constructing the instance such that all budgets can be exhausted simultaneously.
All edges have bids either R max or some arbitrarily small positive ϵ. At first, each arriving ad slot will have d edges with bids R max , one to some lucky advertiser of lowest degree (to whom the ad slot is matched) and (d − 1) edges to some unlucky advertisers of lowest degree. After The remaining ad slots recreate the construction of Lemma 6.4, thus guaranteeing each of the lucky advertisers gains no more than 1 − R max + ϵ. On the other hand, all the lucky advertisers can exhaust their budgets without using any of the R max -bid edges of ad slots neighboring unlucky advertisers, which, as can be readily verified (using, e.g., Lemma 6.1 repeatedly), allows both lucky and unlucky advertisers to exhaust their budgets simultaneously whenever k ≥ d − 1. The described instance is (k, d ) and the theorem follows.
The above bound holds for any R max ≤ 1 2 , as the following theorem asserts. Theorem 3.5. For all k ≥ d − 1 and R max ≤ 1 2 there exist (k, d ) ad allocation instances for which algorithm greedy can achieve a competitive ratio of exactly
Proof (Sketch). In order to generalize the preceding, we rely on the fact that every number R max in the range (0, and the highest bid-to-budget ratio in the copy being 1/a (resp. 1/b). In this case, the overall budget from all copies is n · (w a /n + w b /n) = w a + w b = 1, and, for large enough n, each bid is at most w b /(b · n) < R max . On the other hand, all unlucky advertisers are completely unmatched and garner no profit, and all lucky advertisers gain a total of n · (
As in Lemma 6.4, we can guarantee each such lucky advertiser yields at most ϵ additional revenue.
OPTIMAL VERTEX-WEIGHTED MATCHING ON (K, D)-GRAPHS
The previous section shows that our analysis of greedy is tight, though for a particular(ly bad) input and instantiation of the algorithm. The family of tight examples suggests the following improved algorithm: Match every arriving ad slot to an unmatched neighbor of highest degree. This algorithm, which we call high-degree, is given below. The intuition behind this algorithm, substantiated by the preceding examples, is that unmatched advertisers with higher degree may have fewer chances to be matched later. This approach fares better on the preceding examples (actually yielding an optimal solution), but can it do better than greedy on all (k, d )-graphs? We answer this question in the affirmative, proving a lower bound with exponentially smaller loss. In Section 6, we prove a matching upper bound, implying the algorithm's optimality.
if j has an unmatched neighbor then 3:
match j to unmatched neighbor of highest degree
Analysis of high-degree
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm high-degree is 1
competitive. This is the first result for maximum online matching in regular graphs in the adversarial setting, beating the 1 − 1 e "barrier" deterministically. Theorem 4.1 can be proved directly (see Section 4.2), but to set the groundwork for proofs of our more general results, we generalize this algorithm and rewrite it as a primal-dual algorithm, here as Algorithm 3. The constant C will be chosen during the analysis. 
Proof. We rely on the following observation, verifiable by induction: All unmatched advertisers
For the unweighted problem, b i j = 1. By monotonicity of exponentiation, picking such i is tantamount to picking an advertiser of highest degree. We proceed to bound the algorithm's gain.
Let j ∈ R be some ad slot matched to i. The incurred change to the primal profit equals ΔP = b i j . By our choice of j's match, the change to the dual cost satisfies
Given dual feasibility, the above would imply a competitive ratio of 1/(1 + C). Hence, we choose the minimal C, ensuring z i = 1 by the algorithm's end for all advertisers i (matched and unmatched alike). Recall all unmatched advertisers i satisfy
As such, i has degree at least k by the algorithm's end (but possibly no higher), the minimal C ensuring
. As the dual solution has z i = 1 for all i by the algorithm's termination, the dual cost is exactly D = i ∈L B i . Consequently, the primal gain satisfies P ≥ We can extend our analysis to handle the possible existence of outlying advertisers i that do not satisfy j b i j ≥ k · B i and so may not satisfy z i = 1, ruining dual feasibility. Let S ⊆ L be the set of outlying advertisers and assume i ∈S B i ≤ α · i ∈L B i . As z i = 1 for all i S, we have D ≥ (1 − α ) · i ∈L B i , implying the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Outliers). Let S ⊆ L be the set of outlying advertisers and α be such that
i ∈S B i ≤ α · i ∈L . Then Algorithm 3 gains at least (1 − α ) · (1 − (1 − 1 d ) k ) · ( i B i ), and in particular is (1 − α ) · (1 − (1 − 1 d ) k )-competitive.
Potential-Based Analysis of high-degree
In this subsection, we present a potential-based proof of Theorem 4.1. We note that this proof can easily be extended to provide alternative proofs of Theorems 4.3 and 4.5. Theorem 4.6. Algorithm high-degree achieves a value of at least (1 
Algorithm high-degree outputs a matching that effectively strives to greedily minimize Φ. 4 The initial and final values of the potential function hold Φ start = |L| and
The sum of unmatched advertisers' degrees may seem like a more natural potential function to consider, but it turns out that it cannot be used to derive tight bounds. For example, it does not yield a bound significantly better than
respectively. Denote by ΔΦ j the change to Φ incurred by the arrival of ad slot j ∈ R. Clearly, if j is unmatched, we have ΔΦ j = 0. On the other hand, if j is matched to a neighbor i, previously of degree d (i), we find that i's matching results in Φ decreasing by
, and the increase in degree of each of j's (at most d − 1) remaining unmatched neighbors each cause Φ to increase by at most
. Therefore, if j is matched to i we have
In other words, ΔΦ j ≤ 0, irrespective of whether or not j is matched. By this fact and our bounds on the initial and final potential, we find that
The theorem follows.
ONLINE AD ALLOCATION
In this section, we solve the ad allocation problem. We consider first the equal-bids case, where each advertiser i offers the same bid for all its neighbors (i.e., b i j = b i ∀j ∈ N (i)). This will prove to be a useful stepping stone toward a solution for general bids in Section 5.1.
One way to solve equal-bids ad allocation is via an online reduction to vertex-weighted match- 
Proof. To bound the primal-dual ratio, we bound increases of z c i · B i , as all dual costs can be traced back to past increases of z c i . Consider some ad slot j matched to i. The primal gain is ΔP = b i , whereas the dual cost satisfies 
Proof. Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 imply that increases in z i can be traced back to a previous increase in z c i of the same value or higher. We therefore bound increases of z c i · B i in order to bound the total dual cost. For each online j ∈ R, by our choice of match i, the change to the dual cost is at most (1 + C) times the change to the primal value, as in Algorithm 4. However, by Lemma 5.6, by Line 22, each i satisfies z i ≥ (1 − max j b i j /B i ). Consequently, we have that, before Line 22, the primal value P and dual cost D satisfy
As the primal value is unaffected by Lines 22-23, P above is our algorithm's gain. The competitive ratio follows from OPT ≤ i B i and the definition of R max .
Finally, we note that Lemmas 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 hold for all advertisers i satisfying j b i j ≥ k · B i , irrespective of outliers who don't hold this property, implying the following. 
and, in particular, is
UPPER BOUNDS FOR DETERMINISTIC ALGORITHMS

Maximum Matching and Vertex-Weighted Matching
In order to construct hard examples, we start by showing that the optimal matching in (k, d )-graphs matches all the advertisers whenever k ≥ d.
Proof. By Hall's Theorem, G has a matching with all of L matched if and only if every subset
Consequently, we find that |Γ(A)| ≥ k d · |A| ≥ |A|, and the lemma follows. Equipped with Lemma 6.1, we may now prove this section's main result: an upper bound matching the lower bounds of Section 4, implying algorithm high-degree's optimality. To this end, we cause high-degree to be effectively indistinguishable from any other algorithm. Theorem 6.2. For all k ≥ d, no deterministic online algorithm for bipartite matching can achieve a competitive ratio better than 1 
Upper Bound for Ad Allocation
In this section, we prove an upper bound on the possible competitive ratio of deterministic algorithms in (k, d )-graphs. We start by showing a simple weaker bound, useful in proving this section's main result.
Lemma 6.4. For all ratio R max, no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than (1 − R max ) for the ad allocation problem under the adversarial model. This bound holds even for (k, d )-graphs for all k and d. chosen uniformly among N F (j) by random and, consequently,
On the other hand, by the same argument
with the last inequality following from |N F (j)| ≤ |N (j)| ≤ d. Taking total expectation over the possible states, we obtain E[ΔD] ≤ (1 + C) · E[ΔP]. The theorem follows.
We note that Theorem 7.1 can also be proved using the potential-based proof of Subsection 4.2, observing that the expected potential change incurred by the processing of every online arrival is non-negative. In addition, in the same way that Theorem 4.3 is extended in Theorem 4.5, we can show that random is also robust to outliers. We omit the details for brevity. Finally, we show that random also performs well for the general online ad allocation problem. Proof (Sketch). The proof resembles that of Theorem 7.1, relying on Algorithms 4 and 5, respectively, for the dual-fitting analysis. Dual feasibility is guaranteed by the dual updates. On the other hand, linearity of expectation implies the expected primal-dual ratio matches that of Algorithms 4 and 5 (for the latter, this requires showing that Lemmas 5.3-5.6 all hold in expectation). The claimed bounds follow.
FUTURE WORK AND OPEN QUESTIONS
The study of online matching and ad allocation has seen a surge of interest, both theoretical and practical, ever since the influential work of Mehta et al. (2007) (see Mehta (2012) ). Several natural heuristics, most prominently the natural greedy algorithm, which in the worst case is only 1/2-competitive, were observed to fare significantly better on real data (see e.g., Feldman et al. (2010) for results on the related Display Ads problem); the greedy algorithm was also shown to theoretically outperform its worst-case behavior under some stochastic assumptions (see Goel and Mehta (2008) ). This article attempts to give a theoretical explanation of the empirical success of simple heuristic algorithms for online ad allocation by considering structural assumptions regarding the inputs observed in practice while eschewing stochastic input assumptions. Moreover, our work proposes better algorithms under such structural assumptions that could explain the abovementioned empirical success. The article also raises several interesting follow-up questions.
Optimality for AdWords. We proved optimality of our algorithms among deterministic algorithms for the online maximum and vertex-weighted matching problems. However, for the general ad allocation problem, our lower and upper bounds differ by a factor of (1
. For small R max (i.e., the AdWords problem), this discrepancy is large. Can better algorithms be obtained for this problem, or can the upper bounds be tightened (or both)?
